Is there a Future for Small Hospitals in Germany? by Boris Augurzky & Hendrik Schmitz
Is there a Future






Ruhr Economic Papers 
Published by
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors 
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics, Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 22 83 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231/7 55-3297, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-3655, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Oﬃ   ce 
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #198 
Responsible Editor: Christoph M. Schmidt
All rights reserved. Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Germany, 2010
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-224-8
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the 
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers #198
Boris Augurzky and Hendrik Schmitz
Is there a Future
for Small Hospitals in Germany?Ruhr Economic Papers #124
Bibliograﬁ  sche Information
der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen 
National bibliograﬁ   e; detaillierte bibliograﬁ   sche Daten sind im Internet über: 
http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
ISSN 1864-4872 (online)
ISBN 978-3-86788-224-8Boris Augurzky and Hendrik Schmitz1
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Abstract
We analyse the ﬁ  nancial performance of small German hospitals based on balance 
sheet data of about 1,000 hospitals in 2007. Measures of ﬁ  nancial performance are 
the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) and the 
probability of default (PD). We ﬁ  nd that, on average, small hospitals have more ﬁ  nan-
cial diﬃ   culties than large ones. However, there is considerable heterogeneity among 
small hospitals. While small private-for-proﬁ  t hospitals tend to perform very well, 
small public hospitals face considerable ﬁ  nancial problems. Apart from ownership, 
we ﬁ  nd that specialisation, less subsidies in absolute terms, and a higher share of 
lump-sum subsidies are associated with a better ﬁ  nancial performance.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: I11, I18
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Due to demographic change and technical progress in medicine the demand for health
care rises faster than social resources to ﬁnance the health system. In Germany, until
1993 hospitals had been reimbursed their full costs. Later on, the government has con-
strained annual rises in hospital expenditures by the growth rate of revenues of the social
health insurance. Thus, hospitals’ costs usually rise faster than their revenues and hospi-
tals are constantly forced to improve their productivity. Especially since 2004, after the
introduction of a prospective payment system based on diagnosis related groups (DRG)
hospitals work under given prices and cannot pass higher costs to the health insurances
anymore. This reform has strengthened the hospital’s own economic responsibility, in-
creased competition between hospitals for patients in order to cover ﬁxed costs, and put
strong pressure on costs.
Under this situation many hospitals ran into economic diﬃculties and had to face the
risk of economic default, especially those in public ownership. Some of them were sold to
private hospital chains which restructured them. The market share of public hospitals –
measured by number of beds – has fallen from 56% in 1997 to 49% in 2008 (Destatis, 2009),
while that of private-for-proﬁt hospitals has increased from 6% to 16%. The remaining
share belongs to private-not-for-proﬁt hospitals, typically run by churches. Besides, small
hospitals, on average, face substantial economic problems. Due to high ﬁxed costs and
small market power they are often unable to be proﬁtable or at least to avoid annual
losses.
There is some consensus in the economic literature that there might be a minimum eﬃcient
scale for hospitals, typically argued to be more than 200 beds (see the discussion in Bays,
1986). Hospitals with less than 100 beds are often found to have a higher probability of
closing than larger hospitals (Williams et al., 1992 and Lillie-Blanton et al., 1992). In
contrast, Simpson (1995) argues that the majority of hospitals that entered the market in
his sample of Californian hospitals between 1989 and 1993 was small implying an eﬃciency
at least similar to the existing larger ones.
4While there is an abundant literature on cost and proﬁt eﬃciency of hospitals (see, e.g.,
Hollingsworth and Street, 2006, and Hollingsworth, 2008, for reviews), only few studies
have analysed proﬁts and credit risks of hospitals. Shen et al. (2005) review 14 studies
from the US with data from the 1980s and 1990s that analyse ownership diﬀerences in
proﬁt-margins. They ﬁnd some heterogeneity in the quality of the studies and conclude
that among the most credible studies there is no strong diﬀerence across ownership types.
As regards evidence from Europe, Herr et al. (2010) ﬁnd that German private for-proﬁt
hospitals are more proﬁt eﬃcient than public ones. Augurzky et al. (2009) ﬁnd that
private for-proﬁt hospitals have a lower risk of default than public hospitals.
To our knowledge, there is only one study that focuses on small hospitals and analyses
their ﬁnancial performance in detail. Somewhat surprisingly, McCue (1997) ﬁnds that
among the 783 US hospitals in his sample with less than 100 beds for-proﬁt hospitals have
a lower likelihood to have a persistently positive cash ﬂow than not-for-proﬁt hospitals.
This paper describes the ﬁnancial situation of small German hospitals based on a sample
of 719 annual reports of German hospitals or hospital chains of 2007. Furthermore, we
analyse the distribution of economic success of small hospitals and have a look on which
factors might be behind economic success. We deﬁne a hospital to be small if it has
less than 200 beds and measure the economic situation by earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and, in addition, by the probability of default
(PD) which considers more than one performance ﬁgure of the annual report. The next
section describes the data and methods. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and
results while Section 4 concludes.
52D a t a
The data consist of 719 annual reports of hospitals or hospital chains of 2007.1 Altogether
the reports comprise 1,014 single hospitals. Some chains provide one report for a group
of hospitals. The given annual reports consist of the balance sheet and the proﬁt-and-
loss statement. In addition, we have information on the ownership type distinguishing
between public (hospitals owned by public authorities), private not-for-proﬁt (secular and
religious) and private for-proﬁt hospitals, the number of beds, the number of hospitals in
a hospital chain, the address, the degree of rurality, and per-capita-income in the region
of the hospital. Additionally, we know the amount of annual and cumulated subsidies for
each hospital or hospital chain and the share of lump-sum subsidies as part of all subsidies
between 2000 and 2007 on the level of the federal state.
The unit of observation in our analyses is the single hospital, not the annual report. Since
the annual reports are consolidated for the chains, i.e. we do not have the reports of the
single hospitals, we assign the ﬁnancial measures of a chain to all its single hospitals.
Thus, we assume that all hospitals in a chain have the same ﬁnancial performance.2 This
implies that chains with n hospitals get an n-fold weight in the regression compared to
a stand-alone hospital which is reasonable. Since the potential measurement error in the
dependent variable is not related to the explanatory variables this does not aﬀect the
consistency of parameter estimates. We cluster the standard errors by chains.
For some statistics we fall back on data of the German Statistical Oﬃce (Destatis) con-
taining the full population of all 1,791 general acute care hospitals in 2007.3 Deﬁning
small hospitals by number of beds less than 200, 53% of all German hospitals in 2007
1The data are extracted from the Dafne database and partly collected by own research. Dafne is a
product of the largest German credit rating agency (Creditreform) distributed by the leading company
in electronic publishing of business information (Bureau van Dijk). In 2010 it contained accounting data
for over 105,000 German ﬁrms. Accounting data is collected centrally at Creditreform headquarters and
the quality of the data should be high.
2This is sensible. A hospital chain is responsible for all its hospitals. There are internal cash ﬂows be-
tween single hospitals that are also due to strategic decisions of the chain, not only due to the performance
of the single hospital.
3In contrast to our data set, this does not include purely psychiatric hospitals. Due to data constraints
we cannot calculate Tables 1 and 2 using the full population of all hospitals. However, the sample of
general hospitals covers about 90 per cent of all hospitals.
6are small (Table 1). However, their market share measured in beds only amounts to 18%
(Destatis, 2009). 79% of all private for-proﬁt hospitals are small while this is the case for
only 38% of all public and 46% of all private not-for-proﬁt hospitals. Table 2 compares our
sample with the full population. Our sample slightly overrepresents hospitals of private
not-for-proﬁt and underrepresents hospitals of private for-proﬁt ownership. On average,
the sample includes larger hospitals.
Table 1: Characteristics of small hospitals (full population)
Small All Column (1) as
Hospitals Hospitals share of (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Hospitals
All ownership types 958 1,791 53%
Public 225 587 38%
Private not-for-proﬁt 315 678 46%
Private for-proﬁt 418 526 79%
Beds
All ownership types 85,915 468,169 18%
Public 26,143 229,971 11%
Private not-for-proﬁt 36,006 167,739 21%
Private for-proﬁt 23,766 70,459 34%
Cases
All ownership types 2,854,193 16,670,545 17%
Public 933,688 8,416,378 11%
Private not-for-proﬁt 1,164,911 5,846,393 20%
Private for-proﬁt 755,595 2,407,774 31%
Source: Destatis (2009). Small hospitals: 1-199 beds.
Table 2: Number of hospitals in the sample and the population in 2007
Sample All sizes Small Medium Large
Public 329 (32.4%) 125 (27.6%) 118 (29.2%) 86 (54.8%)
Private not-for-proﬁt 424 (41.8%) 171 (37.7%) 213 (52.7%) 40 (25.5%)
Private for-proﬁt 261 (25.7%) 157 (34.7%) 73 (18.1%) 31 (19.7%)
All ownership types 1,014 (100.0%) 453 (100.0%) 404 (100.0%) 157 (100.0%)
Population
Public 587 (32.8%) 225 (23.5%) 211 (35.6%) 151 (62.9%)
Private not-for-proﬁt 678 (37.9%) 315 (32.9%) 301 (50.8%) 62 (25.8%)
Private for-proﬁt 526 (29.4%) 418 (43.6%) 81 (13.7%) 27 (11.3%)
All ownership types 1,791 (100.0%) 958 (100.0%) 593 (100.0%) 240 (100.0%)
Source: Destatis (2009), RWI hospital data base, own calculations.
Small = 1-199 beds; medium = 200-499 beds, large = 500+ beds
As a ﬁrst measure of ﬁnancial performance we refer to earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by revenues. EBITDA measure prof-
7its from the core business before taking into account ﬁnancial and investment issues.
Note that we do not add subsidies hospitals receive for the purpose of investment to the
EBITDA.4 A second measure is the probability with which an enterprise is predicted to
default within one year (probability of default, PD). The PD is a comprehensive indicator
of ﬁnancial soundness and often asked for by institutional creditors. The PD depends not
only on proﬁtability but also on liquidity and capital structure.
When calculating the PD we do not take into account explicit or implicit guarantees,
e.g. given by public owners such as municipalities. From the perspective of a creditor a
guarantee would reduce the risk of default. However, we want to measure how ﬁnancially
sound is a hospital without resort to external aid. In particular, we intend to measure
the risk to the tax payer who usually has to pay for public guarantees.
Building a model to predict the PD is diﬃcult in a small sample comprising only few
defaults. In our case its direct estimation is impossible because there have been only very
few real hospital defaults in the past. For political reasons, many hospitals at high risk of
default or already at default often obtain public aid or are privatised and, thus, are able
to survive. Given this restriction, instead of constructing an own hospital rating based
on our data we rely on an existing quantitative rating tool. The details are explained in
the Appendix.
The average PD over all annual reports in the sample amounts to 1.2%. The average
EBITDA is 3.6% of revenues. Note that we exclude 12 hospitals from the analysis that
have implausible values of EBITDA-margins of more than 30% or less then -10%. The
average PD of small hospitals is 1.5%, that of large hospitals 1.1%. Obviously, small
hospitals face more serious economic problems than large ones. However, there are notable
diﬀerences among ownership types. Table 3 shows PD and EBITDA by size and ownership
types. Small hospitals of all ownership types have a higher PD than their medium or large
counterparts, but the PD of small public hospitals is exceptionally high.
The average EBITDA-margin does not diﬀer strongly between small hospitals (3.8%)
4In Germany, oﬃcially, investment costs should be carried by the federal states. In fact, only roughly
50 to 60% are paid by the states, the rest is paid for by the hospital’s revenues (Augurzky et al., 2010).
8and large ones (3.9%). However, there are notable diﬀerences across ownership types.
Small public hospitals perform signiﬁcantly worse (0.59%) than both small private and
medium or large public hospitals. Small private not-for-proﬁt hospitals also have a slightly
(but insigniﬁcantly) lower EBITDA-margin than medium or large private not-for-proﬁt
hospitals. Small private for-proﬁt hospitals perform better than medium size and almost
as good as large private for-proﬁt hospitals (both diﬀerences not signiﬁcant).
Table 3: Financial performance by size and ownership of hospitals
PD Size All ownerships Public Private not-for-proﬁt Private for-proﬁt
Small 1.46 2.06 1.18 1.27
Medium 0.84 1.16 0.65 0.86
Large 1.05 1.18 0.90 0.90
EBITDA Size All ownerships Public Private not-for-proﬁt Private for-proﬁt
Small 3.77 0.59 2.62 7.55
Medium 3.51 2.28 3.17 6.49
Large 3.90 2.61 3.02 8.61
Own calculations.
3 Estimation Strategy and Results
3.1 Estimation Strategy
We restrict our analysis to the small hospitals in our sample which are 453 hospitals
and 320 reports and carry out regressions with PD and EBITDA-margin as dependent
variables. Explanatory variables are the ownership type, a dummy for rural regions,
being part of a chain, and the mean per-capita-income in the local area of the hospital.
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9where k =1 ,...,20 are the possible diﬀerent departments.5 This indicator increases when
the hospital focuses on few activities. That is, given a number of departments, this
index increases when a hospital puts more weight on one department. Likewise, given a
certain number of beds, a lower number of departments results in a higher value of the
specialisation-index. The importance of specialisation might diﬀer for urban and rural
hospitals. There might be more competition in urban areas than in rural areas where less
hospitals cover a larger area. To allow for diﬀerent eﬀects of specialisation we interact the
index with indicators for rural and urban areas.
Furthermore, we control for the cumulated amount of subsidies as of 2007 for each hospital
or hospital chain and the share of lump-sum subsidies of all subsidies at the federal
state level.6 The latter is a proxy for the degree of political inﬂuence on hospitals in a
federal state. If the share of lump-sum subsidies of all subsidies is high the federal state
delegates responsibility to hospitals. If it is low the federal state has a strong inﬂuence on
investment decisions of hospitals. The cumulated total amount of subsidies is a special
item in the balance sheet and reﬂects the subsidies of previous years until 2007. We
prefer this measure to the subsidies of the single year 2007 because, ﬁrst, subsidies are
paid irregularly and, second, hospitals beneﬁt not only from recent subsidies but also
from those of previous years. Finally, we include regional dummies for the federal states
as appearing in Table 4 (Saarland and the city states Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen being
the reference group).
3.2 Results
Table 5 reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions for small hospitals. We
ﬁnd that private ownership is associated with a lower PD than public ownership with
only private not-for-proﬁt ownership being signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level, however.
5The classiﬁcation of departments follows the deﬁnition of Destatis (2009) that distinguishes 20 dif-
ferent types. In our sample of small hospitals, the maximum number of departments is 8.
6In Germany, hospitals get subsidies for purposes of investments independently of the type of owner-
ship. These are singular subsidies for large investments and annual lump-sum subsidies for ongoing small
investments. Singular subsidies have to be applied for. Lump-sum subsidies are paid without request to
all hospitals according to their size.
10Table 4: Variable description and sample means
Variable Description Sample means
Small Medium Large
Private for-proﬁt Dummy for private for-proﬁt ownership 0.35 0.18 0.20
Private not-for-proﬁt Dummy for private not-for-proﬁt ownership 0.38 0.53 0.25
Specialisation x Rural Deﬁned as explained in the text 0.33 0.12 0.10
Specialisation x Urban Deﬁned as explained in the text 0.24 0.19 0.10
Rural Dummy for rural region 0.41 0.60 0.52
Share lump sum Share of lump-sum subsidies 0.42 0.44 0.40
Total investment subsidies Cumulated total investment subsidies/Assets 0.37 0.37 0.38
Mean income district/1000 Mean income in e in district 17.01 16.74 16.71
Chain Dummy for being part of a chain 0.49 0.37 0.34
Regional dummies
Bavaria 0.19 0.10 0.08
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.16 0.08 0.13
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.18 0.34 0.23
Saxony 0.06 0.06 0.05
Saxony-Anhalt 0.02 0.03 0.04
Brandenburg 0.02 0.04 0.05
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.02 0.01 0.03
Thuringia 0.02 0.03 0.06
Lower Saxony 0.10 0.09 0.07
Hesse 0.12 0.07 0.08
Schleswig-Holstein 0.03 0.03 0.03
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.05 0.04 0.05
Observations 453 404 157
Small = 1-199 beds; medium = 200-499 beds, large = 500+ beds
Moreover, more specialised hospitals in urban areas have a signiﬁcantly lower PD. In rural
areas specialisation does not seem to have a positive eﬀect on the PD. This diﬀerence can
be explained by more competition in urban areas and, thus, more pressure to sharpen the
hospital’s portfolio. The remaining coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant.
As regards to the EBITDA-margin private-for-proﬁt hospitals perform signiﬁcantly better
than public ones. Note that the interpretation in the two columns is reversed. A low PD
and a high EBITDA-margin reﬂect a good ﬁnancial performance. As expected from the
raw means in Table 3, private-for-proﬁt ownership is associated with a 6 percentage points
higher EBITDA-margin as compared to public. Moreover, a higher degree of specialisation
signiﬁcantly increases proﬁts both in rural and in urban areas. In contrast to the PD
equation, this eﬀect is even stronger for rural hospitals. However, the diﬀerence in the
11eﬀects between rural and urban is not signiﬁcant.
Table 5: Regression results small hospitals
PD EBITDA
Private for-proﬁt -0.632 5.773***
(0.397) (1.178)
Private not-for-proﬁt -0.585* 0.952
(0.348) (0.633)
Specialisation x Rural -0.092 2.826**
(0.684) (1.134)




Share lump sum 2.862 30.089**
(2.526) (12.404)
Total investment subsidies 0.442 -4.898***
(0.889) (1.554)







* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by chains; Regional dummies included
A higher share of lump-sum subsidies increases the EBITDA-margin. 1 percentage point
more lump-sum subsidies – as opposed to singular subsidies –, that is, an increase in
the dependent variable by 0.01, is associated with an increase in the EBITDA-margin by
about 0.30 percentage points. This result can be interpreted as evidence for a positive
eﬀect in case of less political inﬂuence on hospitals. Note that a higher cumulated total
amount of subsidies (per assets) seems to have a negative impact on EBITDA and no
signiﬁcant one on the PD. On average, cumulated subsidies of the hospitals in the sample
amount to 3.7% of their assets. One more percent (that is, 0.01 more of the variable
total investment subsidies) decreases the EBITDA-margin by about 0.049. On average,
subsidies by the federal state might not have been used to invest in measures that increase
proﬁtability.
Thus, although small hospitals are, on average, in a worse ﬁnancial situation than larger
ones, there is remarkable heterogeneity and there are several factors that improve the
12ﬁnancial situation. Especially private ownership, specialisation, and a high degree of
lump-sum subsidies are associated with a good performance.
3.3 Robustness Check
Due to our data structure there might be a concern that the results are somewhat con-
taminated by the existence of chains. Chains as such would not pose a major problem if
they consisted only of hospitals of the same size. Typically, however, chains do have both
smaller and larger hospitals in their portfolio. The diﬀerence in the economic situation
between smaller and larger hospitals introduces a problem because we implicitly assume
that all hospitals within a chain have the same ﬁnancial performance. According to Table
3, larger hospitals, on average, perform better than smaller hospitals. If this is also true
within a chain (which we cannot test) small hospitals that are part of a chain are assigned
ﬁnancial measures which are too good.
As a robustness check we drop all hospitals from the sample that belong to a chain. This
almost halves the sample size to 229 hospitals. Repeating Table 3 for all stand-alone
hospitals results in Table 6. The diﬀerences between the two tables are small. On aver-
age, small stand-alone hospitals have a slightly higher PD than the full sample of small
hospitals. This holds especially for small private-for-proﬁt hospitals. An exception, how-
ever, are small public hospitals that have a lower PD than those in the full sample. As
regards to the EBITDA-margin, stand-alone hospitals even have higher proﬁts through-
out all subgroups (except for medium-sized private not-for-proﬁt hospitals). This holds
especially for private for-proﬁt hospitals.
Table 7 reports the respective regression results. Basically, the results are comparable to
the ones above. The major diﬀerence is that in the PD equation there are no signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients anymore. The eﬀects of specialisation and subsidies on the EBITDA-margin,
however, are even stronger in this subgroup. Altogether, the main ﬁndings also hold for
the special subgroup of stand-alone hospitals.
13Table 6: Financial performance by size and ownership of stand-alone hospitals
PD Size All ownerships Public Private not-for-proﬁt Private for-proﬁt
Small 1.51 1.74 1.31 1.70
Medium 0.87 1.11 0.73 1.03
Large 1.15 1.30 0.92 0.74
EBITDA Size All ownerships Public Private not-for-proﬁt Private for-proﬁt
Small 4.53 2.20 2.71 8.79
Medium 3.81 3.08 3.10 9.62
Large 3.77 3.08 3.44 11.70
Own calculations.
Table 7: Regression results small stand-alone hospitals
PD EBITDA
Private for-proﬁt 0.175 5.363***
(0.526) (1.066)
Private not-for-proﬁt -0.139 0.770
(0.460) (0.767)
Specialisation x Rural 0.466 5.542***
(1.301) (1.866)




Share lump sum 2.392 43.709***
(2.859) (15.500)
Total investment subsidies 0.470 -5.216***
(0.953) (1.643)





* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by chains; Regional dummies included
4 Conclusion
We analyse the ﬁnancial performance of small German hospitals based on 719 annual
reports in 2007 covering 453 small hospitals. We ﬁnd that, on average, small hospitals have
a higher one-year probability of default. Moreover, especially small public but also small
private not-for-proﬁt hospitals have a lower EBITDA-margin than the average medium
size and large hospital. Small private hospitals perform signiﬁcantly better with respect
to the EBITDA-margin. Apart from ownership we ﬁnd that specialisation, less subsidies
14in absolute terms, and a higher share of lump-sum subsidies are associated with a better
ﬁnancial performance. On the other hand, small hospitals in rural areas do not perform
worse than those in urban areas. Nevertheless, defaults of small hospitals in rural areas
might pose other problems than in urban centers where there are many other hospitals
that oﬀer medical services as well.
In order to increase the ﬁnancial stability of small hospitals, especially in rural areas,
politics should delegate more responsibility to the hospital management and the manage-
ment, in turn, should focus the hospital’s portfolio. In Germany, even in rural areas there
is a relatively high density of hospital locations (Augurzky et al., 2010) such that special-
isation of rural hospitals does not necessarily worsen the supply with medical services in
all rural areas.
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Appendix: Modelling the probability of default
Its limited sample size precludes the direct estimation of PDs from our hospital data
base. Instead, we apply the logit score of Engelmann and Tasche (2003) to predict the
16PD associated with each hospital. The formula is as follows:
Logit score =5 .65 − 0.98 × liabilities/assets − 1.37 × bank debt/assets+
2.42 × cash/current liabilities +2 .08 × cashﬂow/(liabilities-advances)−
0.81 × current assets/net sales − 1.49 × current liabilities/assets−
5.26 × accounts payable/net assets +0 .19 × net sales/assets+
0.28 × (net sales - material cost)/personnel costs+
8.21 × ordinary business income/assets − 0.17 × net sales one year ago
This rating tool has been developed for German medium-sized companies on the basis of
325,000 balance sheets spanning the years 1987 to 1999. About 3,000 of the units were
identiﬁed as legal insolvencies. The quality of a rating system mainly depends on the ﬁt
to predict default accurately. Engelmann and Tasche (2003) show that their logit score
outperforms the Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968), the conventional benchmark model in
the ﬁnancial literature to predict a default. We further checked the eﬃciency of the model
against Moody’s KMV RiskCalcTM, a leading credit rating model for corporations. In
the ﬁrst step, we create a broad sample of medium-sized ﬁrms (of all sectors, not only
hospitals) with full information in those accounting data which are needed to produce
both rating scores. About 15,972 balance sheet data, mainly from the years 2002 and
2003 are considered to test for the accuracy, with 81 ﬁrms identiﬁed as legal insolvencies.
In the second step, we apply the concept of a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve to prepare the test on diﬀerences between two rating models. The ROC-curve is
a binary classiﬁcation model that is frequently used to compare the eﬃciency of rating
models (Engelmann and Tasche, 2003). The chi(2) test on diﬀerences of the areas below
the ROC curves shows a p-value of 0.1232 and thus, the null hypothesis of similar areas
below the ROC curves is not be rejected at the signiﬁcance level of 1%.
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